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Unlocking the potential of land is crucial 
for realising the development aspirations 
of the people of Papua New Guinea and 
the island nations of the Pacific, yet land 
policy development has largely been absent 
in these countries. Land is a political ‘hot 
potato’, which goes some way towards 
explaining this absence. In recent years, 
Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu have 
pointed the way forward. Their focus has 
been on getting the land policy process 
right, because without this there can be no 
reform. It is as a result of problematic land 
policy processes that past reform efforts in 
the region have foundered.
The people of Papua New Guinea and 
the island nations of the Pacific aspire to 
prosperity. They aspire to their communities 
enjoying the standards of living taken 
for granted by the wealthy nations of the 
world. They aspire to living in peaceful 
communities, free of conflict. They aspire to 
reticulated water and sewerage systems, to 
electricity and communications, education 
for all, state-of-the-art health systems, 
quality housing and the full spectrum of 
other consumer choices.
Almost all people in Papua New Guinea 
and other Pacific societies have strong 
rights of access to land and are therefore 
well placed to pursue aspirations of broad 
and equitable prosperity. The challenge 
is to improve the way that land is used. 
Doing this will raise income opportunities 
and reduce community-level tensions 
and conflict. It will set the scene for the 
sustained economic growth a nation needs 
for prosperity, including the ability to bring 
education, health, community services and 
infrastructure to the people. Land policy 
reform is not the panacea for poverty, but 
it is a crucial piece in the development 
puzzle.
Papua New Guinea and the Pacific 
island countries do not have a good record 
of land policy reform. Reform of land policy 
has been described as a failed initiative 
in Papua New Guinea (Larmour 2003), in 
Melanesia (Larmour 2002) and across the 
broader Pacific region (Crocombe 2005). 
Most countries have been independent 
for one-quarter of a century or more and 
the opportunities lost during this time for 
building better land systems is lamentable. 
This is not to say that land policy reform has 
not been recognised as a crucial part of the 
development agenda. Governments have 
understood well the need to strengthen their 
land systems; and customary landowners 
are well aware of the need to adapt to take 
better advantage of the opportunities their 
land presents.
100
Pacific Economic BullEtin
Policy dialogue
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 23 Number 1 2008 © Asia Pacific Press
There are good reasons for the decades 
of land policy stalemate in the region. 
The reform task is enormous; it requires 
considerable funds and there are many 
competing development needs. Moreover, 
an all-inclusive process is especially difficult 
to plan and implement. Perhaps the main 
stumbling block for reform is, however, the 
fact that the importance of land exposes it 
as a potential political football. Elections 
can be won or lost over land—which would 
explain the aversion of politicians to become 
involved in land policy reform.
This paper focuses on the importance 
of the process of making land policy reform 
initiatives effective. A framework for 
defining a land policy reform process is 
outlined and used to analyse the initiatives 
under way in Papua New Guinea and 
Vanuatu. Although there are general 
principles in the wider literature, there seem 
to be no international best-practice models. 
This underpins the importance of countries 
designing a process that suits their own 
context with the aid of general principles—a 
point that is evident from the analysis of 
the Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu land 
policy reform initiatives. Although they are 
both Melanesian countries, their land reform 
initiatives are not the same.
Walking the path of process
Any aspirations for a well-functioning land 
system can be reached only if there is a 
functioning process; this is more important 
than anything else. Where past efforts at land 
policy reform in the region have foundered, 
it has been the result of a failure to meet 
this prerequisite. People can talk about 
what is needed to make land work; people 
can write about it in academic journals, 
books and the media; people can debate the 
solutions, but nothing will happen unless 
there is a functioning process. A process is 
crucial for getting things done. It does not 
matter if directions taken within a process 
are less than perfect, as long as consistent 
and continuous steps are taken on the path 
towards a well-functioning land system.
A process is needed because the 
magnitude of the task is huge. It is so big not 
only because of the scope of change needed 
in areas such as regulation, administration 
and the judiciary, but because any policy 
reform process requires the involvement 
of the entire community—as all people are 
stakeholders. It requires also the involvement 
of business, lenders, state-owned enterprises 
and government agencies.
Land policy reforms in Papua New 
Guinea and Pacific island countries cannot 
be developed and implemented in isolation 
within a government agency. They certainly 
cannot be developed and implemented 
from outside by donor agencies. The entire 
community and all affected entities must 
participate because all people have intrinsic 
social and economic connections with land, 
and customary authority prevails over most 
land. There can be no policy issue to compare 
with land for its scope and significance 
among the people. It is for these reasons 
that instituting a process that analyses 
divergent views, facilitates discussions and 
irons out differences—while maintaining 
commitment to the reform agenda—is 
essential.
The mechanics of a process
Three broad steps can be conceptualised as 
representing the components of a process 
for land policy reform: genesis, design and 
implementation (Kikeri et al. 2006). Each 
step is crucial to the success of the process. 
Previous efforts in the region have failed 
mostly in the genesis or design phases.
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Genesis
The idea for a process and the motivation to 
pursue the idea must begin somewhere. It 
begins with the champions of reform. Such 
people might come from universities; they 
could be senior bureaucrats, community 
leaders or business representatives; or they 
could be politicians. Wherever they come 
from, champions have to build support to 
succeed. Ultimately, this means building 
political support. To do this, they need to 
establish their case among political leaders. 
They must also harness broader support 
among groups that are influential in politics, 
including community groups, business 
councils and the media.
A process for creating an effective 
land system can be seen as a 10 to 20-year 
exercise and, as such, requires long-term 
political commitment. To achieve this, 
consensus across politics—including from 
opposition parties—is imperative. Without 
political consensus, governments can expect 
a hostile and intense campaign to derail 
any process—and ultimately to oust the 
government. This means that success in 
getting land policy reform moving requires 
champions to campaign to the opposition 
benches as well as to the politicians in 
power. Land policy reform is not an issue 
that can survive divisive political agendas.
What is it that can trigger the emergence 
of champions of land policy reform, and 
the subsequent establishment of reform 
processes? One driving issue in the Pacific 
is that recent economic growth has been 
poor in comparison with developing 
countries elsewhere, including in Africa 
Figure 1  Annual average growth rates in GDP per capita, selected regions, 1990–2005 
(per cent)
Sources: Calculated and compiled from data in Australia, 2005. Pacific 2020: challenges for opportunity and growth, 
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), Canberra:Table 2.2; and from data available on the 
web sites of UNSTATS, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
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and the Caribbean (Figure 1). In many Pacific 
countries, income per capita has been 
stagnant or has declined. Most countries 
in the region are experiencing a festering 
economic crisis. People in the region aspire 
to prosperity but are becoming increasingly 
frustrated as economic opportunities fail 
to materialise. It is in these conditions that 
reforms with economic objectives are being 
crystallised all over the region and from 
which champions of land policy reform 
are emerging.
Design 
Once the genesis phase gains momentum 
and political support for a land policy 
reform process is established, the next step is 
the design phase. A condition for the success 
of the design phase is to set up a workable 
institutional framework. The experience of 
land policy reform is that there are three 
broad categories for this.
Donor-led approach. Allowing donors 
to take the lead is a common approach to 
the design phase of land policy reform. 
Its acceptance is underpinned by two key 
advantages: 1) the design phase receives 
funding from the donor partners and, by 
forging donor partnerships, funding is likely 
to continue into the implementation phase; 
and 2) donors have strong access to technical 
expertise and international experience. A 
donor-led approach is, however, likely to 
undermine the harnessing of the breadth of 
support needed. To have a contentious issue 
such as land reform being led by foreign 
entities makes the mobilisation of opposition 
very easy. Moreover, a donor-led approach 
is likely to bring to the design team foreign 
biases about land issues and weaknesses in 
understanding local situations—factors that 
could lead to weak technical design. 
Led by the land agency within the 
bureaucracy. This approach would seem 
to make a lot of sense as the established 
government land agencies have a deep 
knowledge of existing land systems, and 
land policy reform is within their mandate 
of responsibility. A distinct disadvantage is, 
however, the potential conflict of interest: 
the agency doing the design will be affected 
by the design. For example, if there is a 
situation of poor governance and corrupt 
practices, there will be resistance to change. 
In these circumstances, champions of 
change from within the land agencies are 
unlikely to emerge. This approach to the 
design phase can work only if there are 
senior bureaucrats within the land agencies 
who are champions of reform and who are 
receptive to a consultative process.
Led by an independent body established 
for the design phase. There are distinct 
advantages in having an independent 
design team—particularly if it is established 
with responsibilities only to cabinet. Its 
independence means that conflict-of-interest 
issues can be avoided. It also means that the 
team’s legitimacy in the consultation process 
will be enhanced. Much depends, however, 
on the composition of the team, its mandate, 
its terms of reference and how it frames 
and pursues the issues. Appointees would 
include those with strong expertise, with 
a diversity of representation—including 
people from commerce and community 
groups and key state institutions. Much also 
depends on government commitment to an 
appropriate level of funding.
Whatever the institutional structure of 
the design team, it is important that it begins 
with the conceptualisation of the structure 
of the reform agenda and its key elements. 
Ideally, it would ensure that the broad 
concepts and ideas of the land policy reform 
agenda passed three quality tests. First, 
they need to be sound theoretically and 
empirically. Second, they need to be suited 
to the country’s socio-cultural context. 
Third, they need to be understood, accepted 
and approved by the wider stakeholder 
constituency, including political leaders 
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and landowners. Unless the basic ideas of 
the policy initiatives are theoretically and 
empirically sound, country-specific and 
accepted widely, there is no point pursuing 
the reform agenda.
A successful design phase for land 
policy reform can be thought of as having 
three broad elements
•	 the design of the policy reform 
recommendations 
•	 the design of the institutional framework 
for implementation 
•	 securing consensus for reform among 
politicians, stakeholders and the 
community at large.
T h e  d e s i g n  o f  p o l i c y  r e f o r m 
recommendations would first require the 
diagnosis of problems relating to land 
through research, inquiry, consultation and 
analysis. From there, remedies could be 
developed and priorities and sequencing for 
implementation analysed, taking account 
of funding and capacity constraints. In the 
design phase, recommended programs 
are often overly ambitious. When this 
happens, the process is set up to fail at 
the implementation stage. To determine a 
realistic pace for reform, the design team 
would need to gauge the available funding 
and the technical skills needed in the 
implementation phase. Where there are 
obvious weaknesses, the design team might 
include strategies for direct intervention 
to strengthen the areas of weakness. 
Moreover, to ensure the sustainability of 
the system its design needs to account for 
the continuing costs of operation and the 
mechanisms for financing these costs. This 
is crucial for the long-term sustainability of 
the individual components as well as the 
overall program.
A realistic approach for the design team 
would be to have a multi-decade view for 
achieving the land policy reforms, but to have 
short to medium-term planning horizons. It is 
crucial to design an institutional framework 
for the implementation phase that can do 
this. There needs to be a link between the 
key components and the implementing 
institutions, matched by the financial 
resource requirements. The absence of an 
appropriate framework for implementation 
will frustrate implementation. The core 
elements are the identification of the 
implementing agencies, their respective 
roles and the linkages between each 
component.
The success of land policy reform 
depends on the ability of the design team 
to win broad support at the political 
and community levels,  and among 
key stakeholder groups. At the core of 
harnessing broad support is a comprehensive 
consultation process, including public 
forums. It must also include targeted 
meetings with stakeholders, including 
business groups, community representatives 
and senior bureaucrats. Opposing groups, 
including non-governmental organisations, 
could be consulted to reduce the risk of 
campaigns opposing change.
To be effective, consultations need to 
facilitate the two-way flow of information. 
Forums could be used as information 
sessions to outline the rationale for the land 
policy reform and the potential directions 
for change. This would help defuse any 
suspicions and fend off misinformation 
campaigns. The forums would also be about 
identifying problems, gathering ideas for 
moving forward and gauging views about 
the proposals. If, as a result of this two-way 
consultation process, the design team moves 
towards recommendations that are less than 
technically brilliant but have widespread 
acceptance and support, this is a much 
better outcome than to have a technically 
brilliant set of recommendations that goes 
nowhere.
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Implementation
Land policy reform processes often fall over 
at the implementation phase. This occurs 
most commonly due to shortcomings in 
the design phase. The consultative process 
might have been lacking and broad support 
was not achieved; or perhaps the design 
was exposed as technically deficient or 
unworkable during the implementation 
phase. Even when the design phase is well 
executed, however, the implementation 
phase can stumble. Key factors could be 
the sustainability of political support, 
bureaucratic support and funding. Another 
key issue might be the lack—or poor 
design—of an appropriate institutional 
framework for implementation. If, for 
example, the implementation phase was 
to be led by the lands department and 
its officials were resistant to change, the 
implementation phase would not succeed.
For a successful implementation phase, 
there needs to be an oversight body reporting 
directly to cabinet (Kikeri et al. 2006). The 
oversight body could be a committee or an 
independent commission and could comprise 
key figures in the reform implementation 
process, including senior representatives from 
the lands and finance departments. It could 
also comprise key stakeholders—including 
community and business representatives—to 
ensure a transparent, balanced and well-
informed process. 
Throughout the implementation 
phase, it is imperative that the oversight 
body continues the dialogue with key 
stakeholders, including a continuing public 
awareness and consultation campaign to 
keep people up-to-date on developments 
and allow developments to be contested in 
the public arena. Failure to do this would risk 
a loss of support and the strengthening of 
any opposition. To ensure the continuation 
of the process in the event of political 
change, dialogue would need to include 
opposition politicians.
The  overs ight  body  would  be 
responsible for delegating responsibilities for 
undertaking the tasks outlined in the design 
phase. It would also have responsibility for 
the monitoring and evaluation of progress 
in completing these tasks. An underlying 
function of the oversight body would be 
to establish and maintain the financing of 
the implementation phase. This part of the 
process could include engagement with 
the local department of finance and with 
potential donors. Donors might also be 
engaged to help procure technical expertise 
where there are local shortfalls.
Another role of the oversight body 
could be to screen new research findings 
for quality and relevance; this might require 
research to evaluate their validity. If the 
ideas are good, they could be incorporated 
into the reform agenda. This screening role 
would insulate implementing agencies from 
the influences of new and untested ideas and 
allow the new information to be processed 
and adopted adequately through the proper 
system of decision making. Pacific island 
country bureaucracies are particularly 
vulnerable to accepting weak policy ideas 
due to their small scale and limited analytical 
capacity. To be effective, the oversight body 
might have to be supported by a technical 
institution or team capable of undertaking 
research and analysis.
Experiences from Papua New 
Guinea and Vanuatu
Land policy reform has been a failed 
policy agenda in Papua New Guinea and 
in the Pacific. A new wave of land policy 
initiatives is, however, under way within 
the region, including in Papua New Guinea, 
Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Samoa. 
The South Pacific Forum Secretariat has 
launched an initiative aimed at raising 
land policy reform issues at the regional 
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level. Australia—the dominant bilateral 
donor within the region—has also initiated 
a program aimed at supporting Pacific 
governments interested in undertaking land 
policy reform. 
With a view to pointing the way for 
policy reform in the Pacific, the conceptual 
framework in the preceding section is used 
to analyse initiatives—past and present—in 
Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu.
Past experiences in Papua New Guinea
There have been several land policy reform 
efforts in Papua New Guinea dating back 
more than half a century. These reform 
initiatives have failed or have fallen short 
of their objectives (Fingleton and ToLopa, 
forthcoming). Two of the more notable 
reform attempts were the World Bank-led 
program for customary land registration in 
1995 and the reform process built around the 
Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters 
(CILM) in 1973 (Manning, forthcoming). 
The World Bank-led initiative was imposed 
on Papua New Guinea, as it was attached 
as a condition to a loan. For this reason, 
the genesis phase of the reform process did 
not begin with local champions of reform 
or the building of widespread ownership 
and support, including political support. 
Instead, the project moved straight to the 
design phase. As a result, the design phase 
was donor-led, presenting an immense 
challenge in winning local support. Indeed, 
little effort to win support was made and the 
program sank amid bitter opposition.
In contrast with the World Bank-led 
program, the land policy reform process 
begun in 1973 followed the key principles we 
outlined earlier for the genesis and design 
phases. From the outset, broad support 
was established and the CILM was set up 
and supported by the Chief Minister. There 
was an appropriate institutional framework 
for the design phase with an independent 
commission taking charge; and there 
was considerable consultation, including 
141 public hearings. The reform process 
stumbled, however, at the implementation 
phase. While there were some initial 
achievements, the momentum from the 
implementation phase was not sustained. 
Measures were not taken to ensure long-
term commitment to a continuing process; 
this can be explained largely by the failure 
to establish an appropriate institutional 
framework for implementation. As a 
result, there were no sustained funding 
mechanisms and no oversight bodies in 
charge of implementation, monitoring, 
evaluation and public consultation.
The current land policy reform process 
in Papua New Guinea
In the three decades after the CILM process 
there has been no progress on land policy 
reform. This has coincided with three 
decades of economic stagnation, rapid 
population growth and declining living 
standards. It is against this backdrop 
that champions of reform have emerged. 
Supported by the increasing availability of 
diagnostic research, the campaign for a new 
initiative on land policy reform gathered 
momentum and, in the middle of 2005, the 
Minister of Lands and Physical Planning 
convened a national land summit.
The task of organising the summit 
was given to a committee comprising 
representatives of government agencies, 
PNG-based universities and research 
organisations. The summit was given 
the theme ‘land, economic growth and 
development’. The broad aim of the summit 
was to outline the rationale for change and 
to discuss directions for moving forward. 
Doing this through a highly publicised 
national event proved a very successful 
genesis for the land policy process.
Expectations of change were built up 
as a result of the summit, providing the 
motivation for political and bureaucratic 
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powers to move to the next phase. A report 
was presented to the National Executive 
Council (Papua New Guinea’s cabinet) 
synthesising the discussions at the summit 
and, from this, the National Executive 
Council agreed to proceed to the design 
phase of a land policy reform process through 
the National Land Development Taskforce 
(NLDT 2007). While membership of the 
task force included the same institutions 
that formed the summit’s coordinating 
committee, the membership of its three 
committees—Land Administration, Land 
Dispute Settlement and Customary Land 
Development—included practitioners, 
non-government representatives, key 
government agencies, banking sector 
representatives and academia.
Having the design phase led by an 
independent body reporting to the National 
Executive Council was in accordance with 
the third category outlined earlier. The 
NLDT executed the design phase with 
considerable success. It culminated in a 
report, launched in February 2007, outlining 
the findings of its recommendations 
(NLDT 2007). The report was endorsed 
by the National Executive Council and its 
recommendations formed the basis for the 
launch of the implementation phase by the 
Prime Minister under the National Land 
Development Program.
Central to the success of the NLDT 
was its strategy of consultation and public 
information. While a team of experts was 
formed to develop the technical aspects 
of the reform, the consultation process 
involved exchanges of views, and the 
directions taken in the design phase were 
influenced by the views received. The NLDT 
disclosed its proceedings to the public in 
full, with full-page advertisements in the 
newspapers, and by keeping reporters well 
informed. Numerous public meetings were 
held throughout the country, and private 
meetings were held with key stakeholders, 
including non-governmental organisations. 
Broad political and bureaucratic support 
was courted to minimise risk in the 
event of a change of government. These 
strategies for building support and diffusing 
opposition were considered by the NLDT 
as fundamental to the success of the land 
policy reform process. According to the 
report, ‘[t]he NLDT has the firm view that, 
in dealing with a highly sensitive subject, 
wider consultations on all land matters 
require careful consideration, as much as 
possible to gain unambiguous support and 
acceptance by Papua New Guinea’s citizens’ 
(NLDT 2007).
It is notable that there was no foreign 
participation in the NLDT process. A core 
strategy of the task force was to restrict 
participation to Papua New Guineans and 
PNG institutions. Traditionally, land issues 
have been resolved through discussion, 
mediation and agreement at the community 
level by members of the community. The 
NLDT process drew on tradition and took 
this to the national level. Land issues were 
dealt with at the national level by PNG 
nationals.
The institutional framework for the 
implementation phase
There is no guarantee that the implementation 
phase will be successful, and it would be 
prudent to heed the lessons from the CILM 
process of the 1970s, particularly with 
regard to the building of a solid institutional 
framework for implementation. So far, 
the process of implementation has been 
positive, with the establishment of the 
National Land Development Program. 
The National Land Development Program 
comprises programs, sub-programs and 
projects within each sub-program. The 
Program is envisaged to be organic. 
To achieve this vision, four important 
components have been established. The 
Project Implementation Unit is the technical 
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body responsible for coordinating and 
driving the implementation of the program. 
Although the Project Implementation Unit is 
located within the Department of Lands and 
Physical Planning, the National Executive 
Council has agreed to outsource the unit, 
with a view to injecting energy from the 
private sector into the implementation 
process.
The next level of the structure is the 
Management Committee, which is made up 
of the secretaries of the key implementing 
agencies. This committee will provide 
oversight of the implementation process, 
with the Project Implementation Unit 
reporting to it on progress and challenges 
during the implementation stage. The 
Economic Ministerial Committee—which 
comprises the key economic portfolios in 
cabinet—is the third important component. 
This committee is expected to provide 
political leadership for the National Land 
Development Program.
Finally, an independent oversight 
body—the National Land Development 
Advisory Group (NLDAG)—will provide 
independent oversight to the implementation 
of the National Land Development Program 
by reviewing progress reports prepared 
by the Project Implementation Unit, 
undertaking independent research and 
screening new ideas and suggestions from 
other research and experiences. The NLDAG 
will have representation from universities, 
research institutions, non-governmental 
organisations and the private sector. The 
NLDAG’s independent assessments of the 
implementation process will be presented 
for consideration by the management and 
ministerial committees.
Substantial funding for the process 
has been provided by the Government of 
Papua New Guinea in the 2008 National 
Budget. A key task of producing a concept 
design document that packages and costs 
the implementation process for the first five 
years has been completed. The NDLP—
designed to be a long-term program with 
an expected minimum limit of 20 years—has 
been divided into four five-year phases. At 
the end of each fourth year, the next phase 
in the implementation process will be 
packaged and its costs estimated.
It has taken one year for the genesis 
phase (2005), one year for the design 
phase (2006) and one year to establish the 
institutional framework for implementation 
(2007). Implementation is expected to begin 
in 2008, blocked into a five-year cycle. 
It is important that the National Land 
Development Program maintains a strategy 
of public awareness and consultation, and 
a process of monitoring and evaluating the 
tasks implemented. It will need strategies to 
build and maintain long-term commitment 
from all sides of politics. After four years, 
it would then be planning for the launch 
of a new phase of the land policy reform 
process.
The Vanuatu experience
In the years immediately after Vanuatu’s 
independence in 1980, a number of land 
policy reforms were implemented. These 
related to consolidating the sweeping 
changes at independence, when all alienated 
land reverted to customary ownership. In 
the next quarter of a century there was little 
land policy reform, but the land situation 
changed considerably, particularly as a result 
of the rapid growth in land development by 
foreign interests and the emergence of a 
lively real estate market. With little attention 
paid to policy, the development of rules and 
regulations appropriate for the evolving 
land market did not eventuate. Significant 
problems have emerged, not least of which 
has been the exploitation of landowners’ 
information asymmetry by wily investors 
and real estate agents. The result has been a 
build up of disenchantment and frustration 
among the people over land issues.
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This mood laid the foundation for 
champions of reform to emerge. At the 
National Self-Reliance Summit held in 2005, 
champions of land policy reform pushed 
for a national land summit (Manning, 
forthcoming). These people emerged from 
community organisations and spread to the 
senior bureaucracy of the Lands Department. 
This was a crucial development, as political 
support was not strong in the genesis 
phase.
The Lands Department initiated a 
major information and consultation process 
in the lead-up to the national land summit. 
Newspapers, radio and television were 
used to great effect to publicise the summit 
process, and to generate discussion and 
debate. By the time of the summit, strong 
political and community support for the 
process had been established. The vision 
for the summit was for it to be a forum for 
the development of a plan on land policy 
issues and for there to be consensus in 
support of that plan across stakeholder 
groups and the broader community. In 
this sense it was to be the cornerstone of 
the design phase of the land policy reform 
process. The lead-up to the summit was 
the period in which broad community and 
political support was harnessed and so it 
might better be described as part of the 
genesis phase.
The national land summit was convened 
in September 2006 and it was a major 
national event. The proceedings were 
covered comprehensively by the media, 
including live broadcasts. The summit 
lasted for a week and included a series 
of presentations and submissions on 
which general discussion was based and 
resolutions agreed on. A core principle 
in the approach to consultation at the 
summit—and during the lead-up to it—was 
that views be exchanged. As a result, the 
resolutions were influenced greatly by the 
forum’s participants.
The summit produced more than 
1,000 resolutions. A technical working 
committee was engaged to distil these into 
20 recommendations built around three 
themes: land ownership; fair dealings 
in land; and sustainable development of 
land (Manning, forthcoming). These were 
considered by the Council of Ministers 
(Vanuatu’s cabinet) and, in the main, were 
endorsed in November 2006 as a policy for 
implementation. This policy included the 
important step of establishing a steering 
committee as an oversight body to guide the 
implementation process, and a commitment 
to funding. Importantly, the steering 
committee comprised a wide representation 
of stakeholders, providing a firm base for 
sustaining a credible process of public 
consultation and awareness.
The key risk in the implementation 
phase is that there is a polarisation of views 
on the issue of land for development within 
the steering committee and in the broader 
community (Manning, forthcoming). 
There are those who would like to see the 
current rapid rate of land development 
continue, while others would prefer a 
substantial reining in of land development 
and increased emphasis on traditional land 
uses. The design phase of the land policy 
reform process was successful in finding a 
middle ground, however, the polarisation 
of views means that this middle ground is 
unstable. Crucial to the continuing success 
of the implementation phase will be for the 
steering committee to maintain a public 
information and consultation process in 
support of a consensual approach. This is 
key to maintaining broad community and 
political support.
To date, progress in implementation 
has been made in a number of areas, but 
has stalled in others—particularly with 
regard to the key resolution of removing 
ministerial powers to sign leases on behalf 
of landowners when the ownership of the 
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land is in dispute. Donor support has been 
provided in the implementation phase, but 
importantly, this has so far occurred in a 
passive way with the steering committee 
taking the lead.
Conclusion
Until very recently, land policy reform has 
by and large been a failed policy agenda 
in Papua New Guinea and the Pacific. 
This stalemate can be explained by the 
absence of appropriate processes. With a 
view to making a contribution towards 
understanding how to reach a successful 
outcome in the Pacific region, this paper 
first defined a conceptual framework and 
then used it to analyse the reform processes 
under way in Papua New Guinea and 
Vanuatu: processes that have demonstrated 
significant promise, particularly in Papua 
New Guinea.
The three core phases of the land 
reform process are genesis, design and 
implementation. Each is critical for eventual 
success. In applying this concept to the 
cases of Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, 
it is clear that there is no strict formula for 
proceeding through these phases, with 
significant differences between the countries 
in the genesis and design phases. Country 
context clearly matters. Both countries have 
progressed to the implementation phase.
In Papua New Guinea, the champions 
of reform came largely from research 
institutions and were led by the Minister of 
Lands and Physical Planning. In contrast, 
the key champions of reform in Vanuatu 
came from within the senior bureaucracy 
of the Lands Department as well as from 
community groups. Also, in Vanuatu—
unlike Papua New Guinea—the momentum 
for land policy reform did not build from 
an issue of economic development. In 
Vanuatu, secure access to land is available 
for investors, so access to land does not 
represent an impediment to economic 
growth. Instead, the genesis for reform 
emerged against a backdrop of growing 
social and distributional issues relating to 
land.
While Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu 
convened national land summits as major 
national events, the nature of these summits 
and the manner in which they were 
incorporated into the broader land policy 
reform process were very different. In Papua 
New Guinea, the summit represented the 
genesis phase of the process. Its purpose 
was to generate discussion and interest 
in land policy reform and to motivate the 
beginning of a land policy reform process. In 
Vanuatu, the summit could be characterised 
better as the cornerstone of the consultation 
process within the design phase of the land 
policy reform process. For Vanuatu, it was 
the National Self-Reliance Summit that 
represented the key genesis point.
Whether Papua New Guinea and 
Vanuatu succeed or fail in the implementation 
stage remains to be seen. Of the three stages, 
implementation arguably poses the greatest 
challenges. The role of the oversight body, 
continuing public consultation and continued 
research, analysis and dissemination 
of information to all stakeholders are 
crucial to maintaining momentum. It 
is also crucial for there to be a strong 
and sustainable institutional framework 
for implementation. While individual 
champions of reform are important, far 
more significant is the need to have these 
individuals embedded in key institutions 
so that ownership and the history of the 
reform process are institutionalised. This 
recognises the reality that individuals are 
mobile and that if key people move, the land 
policy reform process—and hence the work 
of the institutions—must continue. Papua 
New Guinea has put in place a sophisticated 
and comprehensive institutional framework 
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for implementation; Vanuatu less so. 
Again, however, country context matters 
and the workings of government and 
capacity constraints could preclude Vanuatu 
from putting in place something more 
comprehensive.
Finally, reforms are, by and large, very 
difficult. The process and principles described 
in this paper, although focused on land, 
clearly have applications beyond land.
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